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Thomas: The Texas Aeronautics Commission and Its Rate Regulating Function

THE TEXAS AERONAUTICS COMMISSION AND
ITS RATE REGULATING FUNCTION
RICHARD GARY THOMAS

Aviation law, an offspring of the transportation industry, is a relatively new and developing field of jurisprudence. It is certain to develop
and expand as air travel plays a larger role in our vastly mobilized
society. Even at this early date Congress has passed three major enactments pertaining to the regulation of aeronautics.' These acts were a
necessary outgrowth of the increased use of air carriers as a means of
transportation between distant points.
Recently the air transportation industry has found a new market in
passengers traveling shorter distances. This necessarily resulted in some
air passengers traveling only within the borders of a single state. Air
transportation activity wholly within the borders of one state brought
the entry of intrastate airlines into the competitive market providing
shuttle or commuter type services. Basically the only states which
furnish markets that lend themselves toward commuter type services
are those with a sufficient number of large metropolitan areas with
similar or common economic and geographical characteristics.2 California, Texas, and Florida appear to be the only states that possess
these requisitesY Nevertheless, it has been the practice of many states
to economically regulate intrastate airlines.4 By 1961 eighteen states, 5
including Texas, 6 were in the practice of issuing certificates of public
convenience and necessity to air carriers operating wholly within state
boundaries. The scope of this comment is to review the power of the
Texas Aeronautics Commission to economically regulate intrastate
carriers in general, and explore the Commission's authority, if any, to
regulate rates charged by such intrastate carriers.
BASIS OF STATE POWER TO ECONOMICALLY REGULATE INTRASTATE

AIR TRAVEL

The "commerce clause" of the United States Constitution provides:
The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States ....7
1 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568; Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973; superseded by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
2 Taylor, Economic Regulation of Intrastate Air Carriers in California, 41 CALIF. L. REV.
454, 455 nn.3 & 4 (1953).
8 Id.
4 Comment, State-Federal Economic Regulation of Commercial Aviation, 47 TEXAs L.
REV. 275 (1969).

5Id.
6 Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-6, § 3(b) (Supp. 1970).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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It is firmly established that where the subject is national in character
and requires uniform regulation the power of the federal government
is supreme.8 Commerce in this category encompasses not only transportation among states but all commercial intercourse and its component parts.0 Nevertheless, it is equally well established that when
the subject is national in character but its nature does not require
uniformity of regulation, and is susceptible to dual regulation, the
states may regulate the subject matter until the federal government
expresses an intent otherwise.' 0 This simply means that where the federal government has refused to legislate upon an item that affects
interstate commerce, the states have exclusive power of regulation."
Congress expressed an intent to legislate upon certain areas of
aeronautics by enacting the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.12 The act
granted to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) the authority to economically regulate "air transportation"'18 which is earlier defined in
the act as "interstate air transportation."'1 4 The act defines interstate
air transportation as being the transportation of passengers between
a location in one state and a location in another state, or between two
locations in the same state but the travel route being through airspace
of any place outside of tle state of departure and destination. 15 In accordance with the congressional definition of "interstate air transportation," the CAB authority is limited to air travel that actually crosses
state lines. Therefore, since Congress has refused to legislate upon intrastate air travel, the states have the implied power to economically reguTransportation by land, water, and air have all been classified as commerce within
the meaning of the "commerce clause".
Guinness v. King County, 202 P.2d 737, 739 (Wash. 1949).
8 Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 687, 2 S. Ct. 185, 192, 27 L. Ed. 442, 446 (1883);
R. FIXEL, THE LAW OF AVIATION 22-24 (4th ed. 1967).
9 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298, 56 S. Ct. 855, 867, 80 L. Ed. 1160, 1182 (1936).
10 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Ind. Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 327, 37 S. Ct. 180, 185, 61 L. Ed.
326, 339 (1917); Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 399, 33 S. Ct. 729, 740, 57 L. Ed. 1511,
1541 (1913); R. FIXEL, THE LAW OF AVIATION 22 (4th ed. 1967); Rhyme, Federal, State and
Local Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 459, 472 (1946).
11 Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 437, 32 S. Ct. 140, 142, 56 L. Ed. 257, 260 (1912);
Galveston H. and S.A. Ry. v. Wells, 121 Tex. 310, 321, 50 S.W.2d 247, 250 (1932). In Sheboygan Airways v. Indus. Comm'n, 245 N.W. 178, 182 (Wis. 1932), the Wisconsin court made a
similar statement concerning the conflict of economic regulatory jurisdiction between the
state and federal governments in the field of aviation.
12 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
13 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1387 (1964).
14 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(10) (1964) provides:
"Air Transportation" means interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation or the
transportation of mail by aircraft.
15 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(21)(a) (1964) provides:
"Interstate air transportation" . . . mean[s] the carriage by aircraft of persons or
property as a common carrier for compensation or hire or the carriage of mail by
aircraft, in commerce between ... a place in any State of the United States, or the
District of Columbia, and a place in any other State of the United States, or the District of Columbia; or between places in the same State of the United States through
the airspace over any place outside thereof; or between places in the same Territory
or possession of the United States, or the District of Columbia ....
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late intrastate air carriers whose routes do not carry them across the
borders of a single state.'8
There is a want of federal judicial guidance concerning the power
of states to regulate intrastate air transportation. The leading case in
this area is People v. Western Airlines, Inc.'7 which involved the authority of the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to collect
statutory penalties from Western Airlines, Inc., for increasing its rates
between Los Angeles and San Francisco without permission from the
PUC to do so. The court held:
Congress has not sought to extend the economic regulation of the
board [CAB] to intrastate transportation of persons . .. nor has it

attempted to oust the states of control over such rates.'
The court further stated:
Any doubts on the subject should be resolved in favor of state
power for the principal reason ...

that the regulation of intrastate

fares of common carriers traditionally has been subject to state
regulation.'"
In 1963 the Supreme Court of Hawaii upheld the state's power to
economically regulate rates. 20 The court determined that the state PUC
was required by statute to fix rates of air carriers. 2' Finally, in 1970,
the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff
Airways, Inc.22 held:

Congress has not pre-empted the field of the economic regulation
the power to act so long as there
of air carriers, and the States have
28
is no conflict with federal law.

Therefore it may be concluded on the basis of opinions rendered by
the state courts and a reasonable interpretation of the FAA Act of
1958, that states have the power to economically regulate intrastate
air carriers.
TEXAS

AERONAUTICS

COMMISSION AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
INTRASTATE AIRLINES

At common law a carrier could fix its rates at will as long as the
compensation received was reasonable. 24 Thus, carriers had a right to
1 C. Murphy, The Preemption Myth, 8 TAC BULLETIN no. 6 (1971).
17268 P.2d 723 (Cal. 1954), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question,
348 U.S. 859, 75 S. Ct. 87, 99 L. Ed. 677 (1954).
18 Id. at 736. (Emphasis added.)
19 Id. at 737. For a comprehensive review of economic regulation of interstate and intrastate airlines in California until 1953, see Taylor, Economic Regulation of Intrastate Air
Carriers in California, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 454 (1953).
20 Application of Island Airlines, Inc., 384 P.2d 536 (Hawaii 1963).
21

Id. at 542.

22 Texas Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
23 Id. at 200.
4
2 In re Dry Dock, 172 N.E. 516, 518 (N.Y. 1930).
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reasonable compensation, but they did not have a right to charge an
unreasonable rate.25 Through experience it was learned that certain
industries (including many carrier type industries) did not lend themselves to a free competitive enterprise, but since such industries were
beneficial to society the device of economic governmental regulation
was used to preserve the industry and protect the public.2 6
The effect of this policy was to create a quasi monopoly in the industries that were regulated. 27 In order to effectuate economic governmental control, administrative agencies were established to administer
the policies of the government which often called for the regulation of
rates. Administrative rate regulatory authority is not inherent but may
28
be acquired by a direct delegation or indirect devolution of authority.
Rate making has generally been held as a valid delegation of authority
in public utility regulatory agencies if the statute provides a determinate guide for administrative action. 29 Because of the high degree
of technicality and complexity of the industries involved, very general
standards have been held permissible so long as an adequate guide to
the administrative body has been formulated.30
The Texas Legislature has delegated the authority to the Texas
25 See Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 654, 661, 51 S. Ct. 592, 75 L. Ed. 1333,
1337 (1931).
26 Cf. McGowen, An Economic Interpretation of the Doctrine of Delegation of Governmental Powers, 12 TUL. L. REv. 179, 184 (1938).
27 Incorporated Town of Mapleton v. Iowa Public Service Co., 223 N.W. 476 (Iowa 1929).
In this case the court, referring to municipal public utilities, stated that when a governing
body
. . . exercises the power of fixing rates, it waives competition and establishes a quasi
monopoly. In the field of unregulated enterprise, competition tends to secure reasonable
prices. Collusion between competitors creates secret monopoly. The evil of monopoly
is that it tends to create unreasonable prices. A public utility becomes, by the common
consent of the owner and the public, a monopoly. The evil which would ordinarily
arise therefrom is avoided by public regulation. It does not result in unreasonable
prices, because the public tribunal is charged with the duty of fixing reasonable ones.
Id. at 470.
The court further stated that: "A public utility operating under a franchise, has no constitutional right of competition." Id. at 479. (Court's emphasis.)
28 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 644, 646 (1959); see Trustees v. Saratoga Gas, Light and
Power Co., 83 N.E. 693, 695 (N.Y. 1908).
29 United States v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry., 234 U.S. 476, 486, 34 S. Ct. 986,
991, 58 L. Ed. 1408, 1422 (1914); 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 318 (3d ed.
1943).
30 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 318 (3d ed. 1943); McGowen, An Economic
Interpretation of the Doctrine oj Delegation of Governmental Powers, 12 TUL. L. REV. 179,
184 (1937). In his book Sutherland takes the position that in determining whether the
statute provides a sufficient guide so that the delegation is proper, the antiquity of the
regulation is not controlling.
There have been limitations established on the effect of the statutory standards. See
United States v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry., 234 U.S. 476, 484, 34 S. Ct. 986, 991,
58 L. Ed. 1408, 1421 (1914), where the court held that the standard imposed by the delegation should not operate to exclude competition. Also, see Los Angeles Gas and Electric
Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 289 U.S. 287, 303, 53 S. Ct. 637, 643, 77 L. Ed. 1180,
1191 (1933); Seward v. Denver, 131 P. 980, 984 (N.M. 1913), where it was held that a governmental agency fixing rates that prevents a carrier from receiving its common law right to
reasonable compensation is invalid on constitutional grounds as being confiscatory. Contra,
Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d at 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1951), where the court held
that the common law had no place in the regulation of rates in the airline industry.
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Aeronautics Commission (TAC) to economically regulate air carriers
in Texas.8 1 In 1969 the legislature amended the act by substantially
enlarging the powers and duties of the Commission.8 2 The amended
act contains the following provisions:
Without limiting the right, power, and authority of the Commission, to the extent necessary to enable it to perform its functions,
it may approve or disapprove the maximum or minimum or maximum and minimum rates, fares, and charges of each air carrier .... 83
The extent and circumstances under which the legislature delegated
rate making authority to the TAC are not readily ascertainable from
the language of the statute. The trend of the common law courts in the
present century has been to:
... refuse to receive the legislative innovation fully into the body
of the law, and instead give effect to the legislative enactment
directly only. That is, they might refuse to reason from it [legislation] by analogy, but nevertheless give it a liberal interpretation
84
to cover the whole field it may reasonably be made to cover.
Thus, by using this principle in interpreting the rate making authority
of the TAC the legislature appears to declare that it is delegating the
authority to the Commission to regulate rates so long as such regulation
is used to fulfill the functions that have been conferred upon it. The
extent of the delegation appears to hinge on the interpretation of the
term function.35 It may be argued that the statute extremely limits
the rate regulatory power of the TAC because such power is not essential to the performance of the Commission's functions. This argument
may be further supported by contending that the lack of authority to
regulate rates will not limit the right, power, and authority of the
Commission to effectively regulate intrastate airlines.
However, a close analysis of the entire act logically leads to a different
conclusion. In the provision defining the general powers and duties of
the Commission, 3 the legislature directed the TAC to encourage, foster,
31
32
83
34

TEX.
TEX.
TEX.
3 R.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE

art.
art.
art.
658

46c-6 subd. 3 (Supp. 1970).
46c-6 (Supp. 1970).
46c-6 subd. 3 (Supp. 1970).
(1959). (Emphasis added.) See Pound, Common Law

and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908). See generally Pope v. Atlantic Coast line
R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 73 S. Ct. 749, 97 L. Ed. 1094 (1953); Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal
Interpretation,3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 388 (1942).
35 THE RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 574 (Unabridged ed. 1966)

defines the term function as "the kind of action or activity proper to a person, thing, or
institution."
36 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-6 (Supp. 1970) provides:

The Commission, and its Director acting under its authority, is empowered and directed
to encourage, foster, and assist in the development of aeronautics in this state ....
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and assist in the development of aeronautics in Texas, but this is not
the only duty of the Commission. The declaration clause 7 states that
one of the purposes of the act is to provide for the accomplishment of
the purposes of federal legislation and prevent needless duplication of
functions between state and federal agencies. It therefore appears that
one of the primary functions of the TAC is to encourage the development of aeronauticalprogress in Texas keeping in consideration the
purposes of federal aeronauticallegislation without unnecessarily burdening areas of regulation within the jurisdiction of federal agencies.
Can Regulating the Rates of IntrastateAirlines in Texas be a Proper
Function of the TAC
Unquestionably, California has had a larger amount of intrastate airline activity than any other state. Hence competition between CAB
regulated airlines and intrastate airlines for the California markets has
reached comparatively large proportions. It is therefore advisable to
analyze the history of the air travel market in California in order that
Texas may benefit from this experience.
The California Public Utilities Commission is vested with the authority to economically regulate intrastate airlines. 88 Unlike the CAB,
its practice does not include the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity nor the regulation of minimum rates, but like
the CAB it does regulate maximum rates.8 9 As a result of unregulated
price decreases, the competitive rivalry between CAB regulated carriers and PUC regulated carriers was expressed in the form of lower
rates by the PUC regulated airlines. 40 Likewise, the CAB certificated
carriers did not raise their fares as often as they had opportunities to
do so. By 1965, due to the existence of intrastate competition, fares of
all airlines were 47 per cent lower than the fares would have been had
the across-the-board increases and other policies of the CAB been followed. 41 As a result, air passenger travel between 1957 and 1964 increased 257 per cent. 42 The primary reason for this impressive increase

S7 TEx.

Ray. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-2 (Supp. 1970) provides:
It is hereby declared that the purpose of this Act is to further the public interest of
and aeronautical progress ...

by providing ...

for the coordination of the aeronautical

activities of those [federal] authorities and the authorities of this state by assisting in
accomplishing the purposes of federal legislation and eliminating costly and unnecessary
duplication of functions properly in the province of the federal agencies.
The declaration of purpose clause demands consideration because it is as much a part of
the act as any other part. American Airlines v. CAB, 192 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
88 People v. Western Airlines, 268 P.2d 723, 728 (Cal.), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question, 348 U.S. 859, 75 S. Ct. 87, 99 L. Ed. 677 (1954).
89 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMaRiCA 35, 158 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston
1970).
401d.
41 Id. at 113, 226.
42 Comment,

Intrastate Carrier-CompetitiveImpact-Pacific Southwest Airlines, 32 J.

Ant IL & COM. 607, table I at 610, 613 (1966).
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is attributed to the low fares, but the cause of the decrease in fares is
in dispute. It may be argued that the reduction of fares was a result of
PUG regulation, but the better argument is that affirmative action
taken by the PUG had little effect on the relatively low rates. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the PUG lacked control over
43
rate decreases, eventually approved every fare increase requested of it,

and generally regulated 44its maximum rates in accordance with fare
adjustments of the CAB.
Clearly, it was the independent fare policies and actions of the
intrastate carriers and, eventually, the certificated carriers-working in an environment of limited regulation-that45 determined
the low coach fares in the major California markets.

Therefore, it may be deduced that rate regulations of the type that will
encourage intrastate air carriers to express competition in the form of
lower rates will significantly increase the airline's share of the transportation market in Texas 46and thereby encourage and promote aeronautical progress in Texas.

Increasing the volume of air transportation is not the only method
of encouraging aeronautical progress in Texas. Improving the airline's
quality of service by faster, safer, and more comfortable transportation
is another way to accomplish this "progress." Where there was rivalry
between two or more interstate airlines in a major market in the
United States, competition was expressed by improving service quality
as a consequence of the strict maximum and minimum rate regulation
policy of the CAB.4T In California, the intrastate airlines placed a larger
emphasis on price competition since the PUC does not regulate price
decreases. This is evidenced by the fact that the intrastate carriers
have a poorer safety record than the interstate carriers, 48 and the record
of the intrastate carriers in adopting innovations of the industry is not
equal to the record of the interstate carriers. 49 Thus it may be concluded that maximum and minimum rate regulation encourages service quality improvement of the regulated airlines. 5° Such a practice
by the TAC would indeed promote aeronautics in Texas.
43 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 99, 114 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston
1970).
44 Comment, State-Federal Economic Regulation of Commercial Aviation, 47 TEXAS L.
REV. 275, 280 (1969); see, eg., Decision No. 57990, 56 Cal. PUC 779 (1959).
This argument is further supported by the theory that the original fares charged by the
intrastate airlines at initial entry, being relatively low, affected prices. W. JORDAN, AIRLINE
REGULATION IN AMERICA 114 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston 1970).
45 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 114 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston 1970).
46 Cf. Comment, Intrastate Carriers-Competitive Impact-Pacific Southwest Airlines,
32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 607, 615 (1966).
47 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 35 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston 1970).
48 Id. at 50, table 3-4.
49 Id. at 36-44.
50 Contra, W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 176 (Johns Hopkins PressBoston 1970).
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The rate of attrition among the intrastate airlines is a significant
factor affecting the history of the California market, and demands attention. Sixteen intrastate air carriers initiated service in California between 1946 and 1965. 51 Only two remained in operation at the end of
1965.52 Therefore, it may be deduced that the lack of minimum price
regulation by the PUG played a substantial role in the high percentage
of industry failure.
At this point it is evident that rate regulation in general should have
a favorable effect upon the airline industry by (1) increasing the airline's
share of the transportation market, (2) promoting the quality of service,
(3) aiding in preventing industry failure. All of these effects would
encourage the development of aeronauticalprogress in Texas.
Which Type of Rate Regulation of Intrastatae Airlines Would Best
Encourage Aeronautical Progress in Texas
The limited or maximum fare regulatory practice of California
favored the airline industry as a whole in that it significantly increased
the percentage of the transportation market shared by the industry.
This was an advantage to all airlines that survived because lack of
minimum rate regulation appears to have played a large role in the
high rate of attrition in California. Conversely, limited fare regulation
had an adverse effect upon the consuming public because of the lack
of motivation to express competition by improving quality of service.
A major criticism of regulatory agencies is that they tend to be more
concerned with the interests of the industry that they are designed to
53
regulate, than the protection of the public for which they were created.
Any action on the part of the TAC should be founded upon protecting
the interest of the public. The history of the California market offers
affirmative evidence that the proper use of both maximum and minimum rate regulation would benefit the consuming public by encouraging competition to be expressed by improving service quality while
gaining a degree of control over airline industry failure. It follows that
maximum and minimum fare regulation by the TAC would be the
best tool to protect the interest of the public and promote aeronautics
in Texas.
Thus far the only function of the TAC under consideration has been
encouraging the development of aeronautics in Texas. The legislature
has also expressed an intent that the Commission should not engage in
51 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 178 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston 1970).
In his book, Jordan takes the position that the high rate of attrition in California is
significant upon the service quality required of intrastate airlines. He feels that to effectively
compete with interstate carriers, the intrastate air carriers in California had to offer both
significantly lower prices and comparable or superior service quality. W. JORDAN, AIRLINE
REGULATION IN AMERICA 176 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston 1970). See n.50 supra.
52 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 178 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston 1970).
53 Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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unnecessary regulation properly within the jurisdiction of federal
agencies and that the purposes of federal legislation should be considered.5 4 The broad purposes of the Texas Aeronautics Act and the
FAA Act of 1958 overlap. Congress and the Texas Legislature both
express an intent to encourage, foster, and promote aeronautics in
general. 5 The federal aviation agencies are directed to cooperate with
state authorities while the TAG is directed to cooperate with federal
authorities.5 6
In Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.57 the Second Circuit held that
the purpose of federal rate regulation was to provide for uniformity of
rates to all persons through a single regulatory authority rather than
different laws controlled by various jurisdictions. The Lichten 58 case
was concerned with interstate air transportation and not intrastate
air transportation; therefore, the policies espoused in that case are not
applicable to intrastate fact situations. Congress has impliedly expressed
an intent that the CAB does not have jurisdiction to economically
regulate intrastate airlines. 59 Therefore state rate regulation of intrastate airlines will not contravene the purposes of federal rate regulation
of interstate air transportation.
One of the policies of the CAB is to insure adequate service to smaller
communities. The Board attempts to meet this objective by securing
larger profits in major markets through rate regulation, thereby making it possible for carriers to offer better service to minor markets that
yield little or no profits. 60 The Board has also sought to fulfill this
policy by subsidizing its airlines."' Lately, the CAB has been faced with
the conflicting goals of reducing subsidy expenditures and insuring
adequate service to smaller communities. 62 The Board appears to have
given precedence to the former rather than the latter resulting in a
reduction of service to smaller communities. 63 It has been the experience in California that the intrastate airlines provided effective service
to minor markets. 64 Consequently, state rate regulation that encourages
54 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-2 (Supp. 1970).
55 49 U.S.C. § 1302(f) (1964); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-2 (Supp. 1970).
56 49 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (1964); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46c-2 (Supp. 1970).
57 189 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1951).

58 Id.
59 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 21(a) (1964). Congress has granted to
the CAB economic jurisdiction over air carriers that cross state borders. Since Congress has
not passed legislation encompassing intrastate airlines, it may be deduced that it has expressed an intent by implication that the CAB does not have economic jurisdiction over
intrastate airlines. See discussion supra at p. 267.
60 W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 115 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston 1970).
61 See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1964), authorizing subsidies to airlines.
62 Mathews, Certificated Air Service At Smaller Communities: The Need For Service As
A Detriment Of Regulatory Policy, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 27 (1968).
63 Id. at 53, 60.
64W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMEICA 115-138 (Johns Hopkins Press-Boston
1970),
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service to lower density markets will relieve some of the pressure on
the CAB and serve to aid federal policy.
It has been suggested that a state agency applying its authority by
reducing rates of intrastate carriers will decrease the profits of interstate carriers, thereby creating a need for larger subsidy expenditures.05
If this theory is correct, such state action would conflict with federal
policy, but the evidence does not support this conclusion. Previously,
it was determined that lower rates greatly stimulated the air transportation market in general. 6 This provides an opportunity for the interstate carriers to make a larger profit, accordingly decreasing the need
to make subsidy expenditures. Therefore it may be determined that
TAC rate regulation of intrastate airlines will not contravene the purposes of federal legislation to regulate the rates of interstate air transportation. Such state regulation may indeed aid federal policy by increasing service to smaller communities while making it possible to
reduce federal subsidy expenditures to CAB certificated carriers. The
conclusion necessarily follows that rate regulation is a proper function
of the TAG.
TAG RATE JURISDICTION OVER INTRASTATE ROUTES OF CAB
CERTIFICATED CARRIERS

An entirely different problem arises in discussing TAC rate jurisdiction over the intrastate routes of CAB certificated carriers. Recently,
Texas International and Braniff Airways, Inc. (CAB certificated carriers) submitted special tariff applications to the CAB requesting permission to lower their fares approximately 25 per cent between Dallas
and Houston and Dallas and San Antonio. This action was taken in
order to meet competition provided by Southwest Airlines, an intrastate airline certificated by the TAC. The CAB staff under delegation
of authority indicated an intention to refuse to grant the application
on the grounds, inter alia, that the CAB lacked jurisdiction over purely
intrastate transportation. Upon being advised that their proposals
would be denied, Braniff and Texas International withdrew their
applications. 67 Hence it appears that the CAB intends to interpret the
65 Taylor, Economic Regulation of Intrastate Carriers in California, 41 CALIF. L. REv.
454, 464 (1953); Comment, State-FederalEconomic Regulation of Commercial Aviation, 47
TEXAS L. Rav. 275, 281 (1969).
66 In California, competition between intrastate and interstate carriers was expressed in
price competition by intrastate airlines. As a result overall passenger fares were comparatively low. Between 1957 and 1964 air passenger travel increased 257% in California. The
large increase is attributed to the overall low fares. See discussion supra at p. 271 and
authorities cited therein. Also, see W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA, Appendices
Nos. 14(a), 14(B), 14(C) (Johns Hopkins Press--Boston 1970); see also Comment, intrastate
Carrier-CompetitiveImpact-PacificSouthwest Airlines, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 607, table I
at 610 (1966).
67 Letter of inquiry from Charles Murphy (Director TAC) to Robert Murphy (Member
CAB), June 25, 1971, on file at ST. MARY'S LAw JOURNAL; Letter of reply from Robert
Murphy to Charles Murphy, June 30, 1971, on file at ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL. See
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FAA Act of 1958 as not delegating authority to the Board to regulate
rates of intrastate routes serviced by carriers operating under the authority of the CAB. If the CAB formally makes such a ruling, the effect
would be to give state authorities exclusive jurisdiction over rates
charged to all intrastate air travelers. A ruling of this nature would be
difficult to reconcile because the Board would be claiming jurisdiction
over economic regulation of interstate carriers on the one hand,6 8 yet
concurrently, not claiming rate jurisdiction over interstate carriers on
the other hand.
The Board's interpretation of a statute will be upheld as long as
the interpretation has ". . . warrant in the record and a reasonable

basis in law."6' 9 It is questionable whether such a ruling would have a
reasonable basis in the law.70 Nevertheless, assuming that the Board
officially interprets the act in the manner prescribed, and it is upheld
in the courts, could the TAC regulate the rates of intrastate routes of
CAB certificated carriers? In Sheboygan v. Industrial Comm'n,71 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held (under the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938) that where the federal government has declined to accept jurisdiction over an area concerning aeronautics, the state governments may
take priority. Therefore, due to the CAB's denial of jurisdiction, the
Texas Legislature would have the power to pass regulatory legislation
upon the subject matter.
In determining whether the TAC has been delegated the authority
to regulate the rates of interstate airlines operating wholly intrastate,
the same requisites apply as were used to determine the rate making
delegation of the Commission over intrastate airlines. The regulation
must be a proper function of the TAC. In other words, it must (1) encourage the development of aeronautical progress in Texas, (2) aid in
accomplishing the purposes of federal legislation, and (3) not overburden an area of regulation within the jurisdiction of federal agencies.
The mere difference in ownership of a carrier would not affect the
ability of the TAC to benefit air travelers and the air industry as a
whole in Texas. As in the case of intrastate airlines, rate regulation of
both intrastate routes of CAB certificated carriers and intrastate airlines
generally C. Rhyne, Federal, State And Local Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 11 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 459, 471 (1946).
68 For example, the CAB issues certificates of public convenience to air carriers that
cross state lines.
69 American Airlines v. CAB, 178 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1949).
70 It would appear that a reasonable interpretation of the FAA Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1301(10), 1301(21), 1371-1387 (1964), vests in the CAB the jurisdiction to economically
regulate all air carriers that cross state borders. Specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1964),
imposes upon the Board the duty to regulate interstate airline rates. Cf. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 294 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 927, 82 S. Ct. 363, 7 L. Ed.2d 191 (1961). See discussion supra at 267.
71 Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Comm'n, 245 N.W. 178, 182 (Wis. 1932).
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may (1) increase the airline's share of the transportation market (2) improve service quality and (3) decrease the rate of industry failure. In
fact, extending the TAC's jurisdiction would increase the Commission's opportunity to perform its functions through rate regulation
because the fares of all intrastate flights would be within the jurisdiction
of the Commission.
It is debatable whether such rate jurisdiction of the TAC would
aid in accomplishing the purposes of federal legislation. In Airline
Pilot's Assoc. International v. Quesda,72 the Second Circuit held that
the purpose of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was to centralize in a
single authority the power to create rules for the maximation of safety
and efficiency for the use of the nation's airspace. 73 It will be recalled
that in Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,74 the court held that the purpose of the federal rate regulation was to vest in a single agency the
authority to insure uniformity of rates to all persons.7 5 These policies
contemplate interstate air transportation over which the CAB asserts
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

If the CAB denies jurisdiction over intrastate routes of CAB certificated carriers, how can it be effectively argued that the principles of
single agency and uniformity of rates apply? Surely it was not the intent of Congress nor the Texas Legislature to create a class of air carriers that are not susceptible to any type of rate regulation. "It is not
in the public interest for an air carrier to enter the field and then
operate as it chooses.176 One of the purposes behind federal rate regulation of air carriers is to prevent rate wars and discriminatory practices
like those which occurred in the railroad industry during the period of
the "robber barons." 77 The very fact that Congress provided for rate
regulation of interstate airlines signifies that it does not believe the
airline industry lends itself to a free competitive enterprise. Therefore
TAC rate regulation of intrastate routes of CAB certificated carriers
would serve to fulfill federal policy. It follows that such regulation
would be a proper function of the TAC. In this event, it would appear
that it would be the duty of the TAC to fill the vacuum created by the
CAB.
72 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
73 Id. at 894.
74 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
75 Id. at 941.
76 Application of Island Airlines, Inc., 384 P.2d 536, 542 (Hawaii 1963).
77 A. THOMAS, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORTATION
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